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The true impact of economic sanctions on a targeted state has been widely debated, often through the 
analysis of macroeconomic data in historic case studies. This paper provides new insight into the effect 
of economic sanctions on earnings, job-switch behavior and employment through the adoption of 
micro-level data in Russia from 2010-2018 using the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). 
Furthermore, this paper contributes a new methodology in estimating the severity of sanctions on a 
targeted state through correlating changes in stock prices to severity weights and generating a points 
system to track the ramifications of individual sanctions. This paper focuses on two primary points 
relating to Russian sanctions: 1) the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and E.U. on Russia in response to 
the Ukraine Crisis and 2) Russia’s retaliatory sanctions on agricultural imports as response to Western 
sanctions. I find that Western sanctions decrease Russian average monthly earnings while Russia’s 
retaliatory sanctions lead to an increase in earnings, domestic ownership and employment in the 
Russian agricultural sector. These findings display the microeconomic repercussions that are often 
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I. Introduction  
 The degree to which economic sanctions truly impact a targeted country has been a highly 
disputed topic amongst researchers due to their increased use as a tool of foreign policy across the 
world. These studies tend to focus primarily on macroeconomic data, examining broad economic 
success, or lack thereof, in a targeted country. However, countries have begun opting to impose 
sanctions on individuals, companies, and industries in order to avoid economic warfare against the 
civilians of a state. With these highly specified forms of economic sanctions emerging, microeconomic 
data has materialized as the most precise means through which the impact of economic sanctions may 
be accurately measured.  
The international sanctions resulting from the Ukrainian Crisis serve as a modern, and ongoing 
case study into the impact of economic sanctions. While previous research has focused on the effect 
of sanctions through macroeconomic data, this paper provides a unique insight into the consequence 
of economic warfare through the use of microeconomic, individual-level data. Utilizing changes in 
GNP to measure the historical effect of sanctions, Davis and Engerman (2003) note that sanctions 
“composed of various restrictions on international trades, financial flows or the movement of people” 
tend to yield the highest repercussions. However, with sanctions concentrating on singular firms or 
industries, macroeconomic means such as GNP lose their validity due to their inability to distinguish 
the true effect of sanctions from other exogenous factors influencing the broad economy. Using 
microeconomic data, I am able to pinpoint the effect of sanctions on various sectors within the 
Russian economy rather than the broader market as a whole. As the sanctions placed on Russia by the 
U.S. and E.U. were almost exclusively fixated on the sectors of energy, defense, finance, construction 
and electric utilities, the use of microeconomic data allows for a concentrated inquiry into the 
repercussions of sanctions on these targeted industries relative to the burden, if any,  felt by other 
industries within the Russian economy. In deconstructing the sanctions with respect to their intended 
 5 
industries, I am able to bring forth a new analysis regarding one of the most highly disputed questions: 
do sanctions work? 
This study offers not only the first micro-level analysis of U.S. and E.U. sanctions on Russia, 
but also, to my current knowledge, of economic sanctions as a whole. In offering a microeconomic 
inquiry into the impact of economic sanctions, the avenues through which the shocks of sanctions 
migrate an effected economy are able to be observed. Through examining the influence of sanctions 
over earnings and job-switch behavior by industry, the potential far-reaching negative externalities of 
economic sanctions on individuals are able to be thoroughly monitored over time. 
 In this paper, I study the change in earnings and job-switch behavior due to economic 
sanctions imposed on Russia by the U.S. and E.U. from 2014 – 2018. I use the Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS) along with new individually developed severity indices to capture the 
effect of economic sanctions on Russian earnings in the short-run. Enforced as a result of the 
Ukrainian Crisis beginning in 2013, sanctions on Russia are often studied through a political eye, 
scrutinizing the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. As sanctions aim to change the 
“target nation’s policies by inflicting economic damage,” it appears reasonable to examine sanctions 
through this political eye (Nuenkirch and Neumeier 2016). Nevertheless, it remains paramount to 
consider the possible domino effect created by these sanctions, sending market ripples, shockwaves, 
throughout the target nation’s economy. While GNP or GDP along with other macroeconomic data 
serve as general economic measures, the effect of sanctions on labor market outcomes in Russia may 
only be measured through microeconomic evidence. In this sense, to my current knowledge, this paper 
stands alone, and unique, in its use of individual-level panel data to measure the lasting impression, if 
any, of sanctions on the Russian labor market.  
 This paper also provides substantial insight into the effects of sanctions on citizens, rather 
than governments as a whole. While economic sanctions are often used in foreign policy to pressure 
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another state towards a desired objective, the question remains as to whether these sanctions 
undermine the intended government or, rather, simply constrain the welfare of said country’s citizens. 
Therefore, sanctions present severe negative externalities, as they “often appear to have devastating 
consequences on the overall quality of life of the citizens of the target state” (Nuenkirch and Neumeier 
2016). The individual-level data used in this paper allows for an analysis of the effect of each individual 
sanction on an individual’s earnings across multiple sectors. Furthermore, we observe individuals’ job-
switching behavior between foreign and domestic firms in an industry due to sanctions. The results 
from these estimations can then be used comparatively both across sectors and sanctions in order to 
effectively assess the hardships incurred by individuals through multiple time periods. Therefore, this 
paper provides an examination on whether or not civilians become caught in the crosshairs of 
economic warfare between two states.  
 Through the use of micro-level data and newly developed measures of sanction severity, this 
paper finds a decrease in average monthly earnings in the Russian industries of finance, defense, 
energy, construction and electric utilities due to economic sanctions. The number of individuals 
working for a foreign firm within these same industries also registers a slight decrease as a result of 
sanctions. Concerning Russia’s retaliatory sanction against foreign agricultural products, the average 
monthly earnings of individuals working in agriculture drastically increase. Furthermore, the number 
of individuals working for a domestic firm within the industry of agriculture sharply rises, mirrored by 
a steep decline of non-employed individuals in the agricultural sector.  
 The paper will proceed as follows: section II presents further background on the history of 
sanctions against Russia, previous literature on sanctions and insight into the creation of data on 
sanctions along with their severity indices. Section III contributes a theoretical discussion regarding 
the channels through which sanctions impact the labor market while section IV describes the RLMS 
data source and outlines how this data was merged with the sanctions’ data. The empirical model along 
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with the methodology used is detailed in section V, followed by the presentation and discourse of the 
results in section VI.  Lastly, section VII administers a conclusion.  
II. Institutional Background 
2.1 History 
 The contemporary use of economic sanctions emerged as an essential tool of foreign policy 
primarily following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war. The primary motive 
for the use of economic sanctions was a need for alternative measures to quell political strife without 
war. In this sense, economic sanctions allowed for the intentional constraint of trade or financial 
relations in order to bring about political goals in a targeted country. Through the imposition of 
economic sanctions, a country aims to bring about political or economic instability in a targeted 
country in order to force a desired resolve. Therefore, modern sanctions serve as a decisive tool in 
foreign policy for their ability to express distaste towards another state without the destructive fallout 
of war.  
 Stemming from the Ukrainian Crisis beginning in 2013, sanctions on Russia have endured as 
an economic shock into present day. The Ukraine Crisis originally erupted on November 21, 2013 
with then Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych ceasing discussions regarding European integration 
with the E.U., leading to mass protests in Ukraine as response. Russia emerged as a major player in 
the Ukraine Crisis on March 1, 2014 with Russia’s parliament approving the request of President 
Vladimir Putin to send Russian forces into Crimea, a peninsula located in southern Ukraine. After 
Crimeans voted in a referendum on March 16, 2014 to re-join Russia, the Treaty on Accession of the 
Republic of Crimea to Russia was signed by President Vladimir Putin on March 18, 2014, leading to 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the U.S. and E.U. 
launched a wave of sanctions via visa restrictions and asset freezes on several Russian and Ukrainian 
officials on March 17, 2014. Throughout the year, the U.S. and E.U. continued to levy multiple waves 
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of various sanctions against Russia, leading to a retaliation by Russia on August 6, 2014, banning the 
import of agricultural and food products from the U.S., E.U. and any other countries that had imposed 
sanctions on them. These sanctions persists into modern day along with their extensive grasp as the 
U.S. currently designates 224 individuals and 456 entities on the Office of Foreign Asset Control’s 
Sanctions List (U.S. Department of the Treasury).1 
 
2.2 Literature  
In measuring the difference in wages stemming from an international economic shock, Hijzen 
et al. (2013) offer a cross- country analysis of the effects of foreign ownership on wages using firm-
level and worker-firm data. This paper seeks to analyze the role of foreign ownership on wages, worker 
turnover rates, and employment through changes in ownership status that result from cross border 
acquisitions or worker movements. As a result, the paper is able to offer internationally comparable 
evidence of foreign ownership’s effect on average wages while controlling for worker selection (Hijzen 
et al. 2013). The primary goal of this paper and my own align in trying to find the difference in turnover 
rates between firms with domestic and foreign ownership. However, instead of using an acquisition 
or worker movement as the shock, I use sanctions imposed by the U.S. and E.U. on Russia. In their 
methodology for firm level data, Hijzen et al. (2013) used two treatment dummy variables to measure 
the effect of ownership changes on wages: 1) a foreign takeover of a domestic firm and 2) a domestic 
takeover of foreign firms. Furthermore, regarding worker-level data, a treatment indicator is used to 
account for worker composition effects (Hijzen et al. 2013). Regarding Russia’s retaliation sanction 
on the U.S. and E.U., I use a similar treatment indicator to identify whether or not an individual works 
in the agricultural sector. In order to measure their results, Hijzen et al. (2013) use a difference-in-
 
1 There are currently 190 persons and 47 entities subject to restrictive measures by the E.U. due to actions undermining 
the independence of Ukraine (E.U. Council Decision 2014/145 & 2020/128).  
 9 
differences (DID) estimator to measure the difference in wages induced by a foreign takeover of a 
domestic firm. In using a DID model,  they are able to control for any pre-existing, constant 
differences in the outcome variable before the change in ownership (Hijzen et al. 2013). Building off 
their method,  I construct a similar DID model in which the difference in earnings for the agricultural 
sector can be detected through the imposition of sanctions. Furthermore, I expand the model by 
Hijzen et al. (2013) in adopting a fixed effects model that can measure the difference in earnings across 
the sectors of finance, energy, defense, construction and electric utilities due economic sanctions. 
 An ongoing and accessible case of the economic shocks generated from sanctions, the 
literature on Russian sanctions arising from the Ukraine Crisis is notably sparse. While these sanctions 
have prompted research from a political background, the economic analysis, especially 
microeconomic, regarding the significance of these sanctions remains virtually untapped. Dreger et al. 
(2016) aim to differentiate between the impact of economic sanctions and oil prices on the steep 
decline of the Russian ruble, which strongly correlates to the economic performance of Russia. The 
macroeconomic data used in this study is time series data on nominal bilateral exchange rates, Brent 
oil price, and interest rates for overnight loans in rubles. Since the data on national accounts are limited 
due to low reporting frequencies, the exchange rate movements emerge as an alternative with daily 
frequencies that can be applied to a short time period in order to analyze the impact of sanctions and 
decline in oil prices (Dreger et al. 2016). Instead of exchange rate movements, I employ the use of 
stock market data due to their daily frequency and public availability in order to monitor the effect of 
sanctions on earnings and job-switch behavior in Russia. The results found by Dreger et al. (2016), 
however, indicate that the lofty decline in Ruble’s exchange rate can primarily attributed to a drop in 
oil prices. Therefore, Dreger et al. (2016) establish a favorable, systemic method to detect the disparity 
in consequences of falling oil prices and economic sanctions on the Russian ruble.   
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 As one of few economic papers evaluating the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian 
economy, Gurvich and Prilepskiy (2015) interpret the significance of these sanctions through 
modeling capital flow components, accounting for other factors such as falling oil prices. In tracing 
the main channels of the financial sanctions’ influence on the real sector, three main classification 
components emerge: 
• Increasing uncertainty (beginning even before the sectoral sanctions were introduced) 
slows down consumption due to rising precautionary savings (often 
in USD) and dwindling investments due to higher risk premiums; 
• Increased cost of debt financing limits access to refinancing, thereby affecting  
investment opportunities for companies. Moreover, restrictions on technology 
exports to the Russian Federation constrain the potential growth of total factor 
productivity; and 
• Production in sectors dependent on imported components suffers from the ruble ’s 
sharp fall (Mau and Ulyukaev 2015). 
Since most of these financial sanctions were imposed on major publicly owned companies in the 
finance, energy, defense, construction and electric utilities sectors, I suspect that these influences on 
the real sector will be largely incorporated into the stock price of these companies (Guryich and 
Prilepskiy 2015). To this extent, the knowledge relating to a company’s financials and production are 
public information, leading to investors carrying similar fears that are previously mentioned regarding 
the financial sanctions’ influence on the real sector. In focusing exclusively on the financial sector 
within Russia, Guryich and Prilepskiy (2015) account for the varying degrees and specificity of the 
sanctions imposed. They attempt to decompose the sanctions into four channels: direct effects, 
indirect effects, reaction to the sanctions, and second-order effects. Direct effects mean restrictions 
placed on the foreign borrowings of Russian issuers, indirect effects pertain to the potential for new 
sanctions or an expansion of existing sanctions, the reaction to sanctions are the personalized nature 
of the direct and indirect that prevent foreign debt from being refinanced, and second-order effects 
involve changes in key macroeconomic indicators in response to reduced net capital inflow (Guryich 
and Prilepskiy 2015). While macroeconomic data is still used as a measure, Guryich and Prilepskiy also 
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study firm level data from Sberbank, VTB, and Gazprombank. Moreover, they consider the varying 
ramifications that are inherently implied with each sanction. Similarly, I attempt to account for these 
implicit effects of each sanction by establishing a lagged severity index while also reviewing the revenue 
ranking of the firms listed in each sanction with regards to the Russian 500 list. Therefore, Guryich 
and Prilepskiy provide strong insight into methods for quantifying the impact of Western sanctions 
on Russia through capital flow models in publicly traded companies within the financial sector.  
  
2.2 Sanctions Data 
 The data on sanctions was created by compiling all sanctions related to Russia from 2014 – 
2018 as provided by the U.S. Department of the Treasury as well as the Publications Office of the 
European Union. The information regarding the retaliatory sanction by Russia was obtained through 
the Foreign Agricultural Service, the foreign affairs branch of the United States Department of 
Agriculture. Through these sources, I was able to construct a chronological timeline of all sanctions 
imposed by either the E.U., U.S., or Russia. This chronological timeline also incorporates information 
regarding who imposed the sanction, the industry affected, the number of firms affected, and whether 
or not the firms were located in Crimea. The name of every firm or entity included in a sanction were 
incorporated into this dataset, allowing me to research each firm individually in order to establish to 
which industry the firm appertains as well as their geographical location. The location of the firm was 
taken into account as some sanctions were placed primarily on Crimean companies, whose 
information would not be reflected in the data on Russian earnings. Sanctions, asset freezes, or travel 
bans placed on individuals were not recorded in the sanctions data as it would not be expected that a 
restriction on a single individual would impact Russian earnings as a whole. Lastly, since most 
sanctions by the U.S. and E.U. primarily targeted the sectors of finance, energy, finance, construction, 
and electric utilities, sanctions were categorized by the industry which they targeted. The finance, 
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energy, and defense sectors serve as the largest portion of the data affected by sanctions, however, 
firms within the industries of construction and electric utilities were also sanctioned due to their 
involvement in projects located within Crimea. Although these firms were sanctioned for their work 
in Crimea, the geographical location of these companies remains in Russia. Therefore, these industries 
are included within the industries affected by sanctions, although they account for a smaller portion 
of the data relative to the finance, energy, and defense sectors. Industries other than those previously 
mentioned were categorized as ‘other’ for their industry. Since Russia responded with a singular 
retaliation against the agricultural sector, Russia’s only imposed sanction is listed under the industry 
‘agriculture.’  
 The largest quarrel regarding the estimations and results within this paper primarily relate to 
the process through which the severity indices were designed. Since all economic sanctions greatly 
vary in their breadth, time and origin along with the highly disputed historical effect of sanctions as a 
whole, there exists no definitive method to measure the severity of each individual economic sanction. 
As each sanction’s severity, determined by my indices, directly influences the measured effect of said 
sanction on Russian wages, the severity indices stand as the largest aspect of discord within this paper.   
 In order to eliminate as many biases as possible in establishing the severity of each sanction, 
there are two separate avenues of approach that may be applied: the stock market and firm size. Four 
separate severity indices were created in order to measure the weight of each sanction. Weights for 
three of these indices are appraised through stock market data while the remaining severity index 
correlates to the size of sanctioned firms. Each of these methods use different data sources to predict 
the severity of a sanction, leading to a pool of severity indices that produce comparative results for 
the effect of a sanction on Russian earnings and job switch behavior. Furthermore, these varying 
measures of severity allow for the impact of sanctions to be evaluated through separate avenues of 
approach, accounting for the debate regarding how sanctions affect a given state.  
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Stock Market Weights: 
The first index, the MOEX Severity Index, uses the daily returns of six indices within the 
MOEX Russia Index to evaluate the severity of each sanction. Similarly, the FactSet Severity Index 
and the Russia Trading System Index (RTSI) calibrate severities in an identical method, however, the 
components, the selected stocks that make up the index, vary across these separate indices. The three 
methods used in calculating the weights of the severities for the stock market indices are the Parallel 
Weight, Base Zero Weight and Equation Weight.2 Since the stock market reflects the evaluation of 
companies based off of immediate information, the days prior to a sanction being introduced must be 
calculated into the evaluation of severity. In anticipating the announcement of new economic 
sanctions, stock prices may adjust prior to the official disclosure of new restrictions. Therefore, the 
stock market severities include the two days prior to the declaration of new sanctions in estimating 
severity. A severity weight with a positive value indicates a sanction with a significant impact while a 
negative value implies a sanction has had no, or a reversed, impact. In this paper, we are focused on 
the positive value impacts that sanctions spawn, leading to repercussions in the Russian labor market. 
The Parallel Weight is a simple measure of severity where, after a new sanction has been introduced, 
the weight of the severity equals the inverse percentage change in a stock or index. Therefore, if a 
sanction were to drop the price of an index by 5%, the severity of the sanction would be +5. The 
Parallel Weight is the primary method used in estimating the impact of sanctions on earnings and job 
switch-behavior within this paper. A description regarding the calculations of the Base Zero Weight 





2 Examples of weights produced by each of these measures can be found in the appendix.  
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Firm Size Weights:  
Dreger et al. (2016) develop a sanction index that presents the characterization of western 
sanctions into three categories: 1) sanctions against persons, 2) sanctions against entities and 3) 
sanctions against industries.3 While these categories provide an accurate description of the most 
common types of sanctions imposed by the West, the disparity within these categories themselves is 
vast. Therefore, I expand on this index in delineating weights to sanctions based off of the sizes of 
sanctioned firms. Furthermore, since I am focused on the effect of sanctions on earnings by industry, 
the category relating to sanctions against individual persons has been removed.  
The Firms and Revenue Index constructs weights associated with each sanction based on the 
size of the sanctioned firms. The weights for the Firms and Revenue Index are based off of a points 
system related to the size of each listed firm in a given sanction, generating a total severity score for a 
sanction from the sum of each sanctioned firm’s weight.  
 
Table 1: Firms and Revenue Points System4 
 
Category Description Weight 
Entire Sector/Industry Sanctioned 15 
Sanctioned firm in top 50 revenues in Russia 10 
Sanctioned firm in top 100 revenues in Russia 5 
Sanctioned firm in top 500 revenues in Russia 2 
Other Sanctioned Firms 1 
 
 
3 The sanction index developed by Dreger et al. (2016) can be found in the appendix.  
4 The revenue rankings of Russian companies are sourced from the 2015 rankings of РБК 500: Крупнейшие 
Компании России. 
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Using the points system depicted above, the following equation can be used to calculate the severity 
of a sanction with FRIW standing as the total weight of the sanction as determined by the Firms and 
Revenue Index: 
FRIW= (#Top 50 Firms)(10)+(#Top 100 Firms)(5) 
+(#Top 500 Firms)(2)+ (# Other Sanctioned Firms)(1) [+15 if Entire Industry affected].5 
The Parallel Weight and Firms and Revenue Index are the two primary methods used in 
estimating the effect of sanctions on Russian earnings and job-switch behavior within this paper. The 
Parallel Weight was selected as the primary stock market weight due to its capability to reflect both 
increases and decreases in stock market data as a result of sanctions being imposed. In this sense, the 
Parallel Weight is unbiased in registering the effect of sanctions as it accounts for the possibility of 
both negative and positive effects on the Russian economy. Furthermore, the Parallel Weight 
determines the severity of sanction in a simple manner, where the severity is directly correlated to the 
change in stock market price. The Firm and Revenue Index is adopted in order to offer a second, 
separate method in estimating the severity of a sanction, where weights are determined through a 
categorical points system. 
III. Theoretical Discussion 
 In estimating the impact of economic sanctions using micro-level data, it is paramount to 
discern the channels through which the imposed sanctions disturb the previous economic equilibrium. 
However, there exists no theoretical models outlining the effect of economic sanctions on labor 
markets. Yet, there are various theoretical models pertaining to tariffs as well as market liberalization 
and their impact on labor markets. While tariffs are used to protect industries or countries, a state 
 
5 15 points are only added to the equation if an entire industry or sector has been sanctioned as recorded by the U.S. or 
E.U. 
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imposes sanctions to damage another country’s economy. Similarly, market liberalization refers to the 
relaxation of government policy while sanctions relate to implementing restrictions on a target 
economy. In this sense, tariffs and market liberalization aim to improve the overall economy and 
wellbeing of a country, but sanctions are intended to be detrimental towards a targeted country’s 
economy. Therefore, since market liberalization and tariffs are contrary to sanctions, the impact of 
economic sanctions can be traced through the inverse of these theoretical models. 
 In estimating the effect of protection, tariffs, on wages in a domestic industry, Gaston and 
Trefler (1994) define protection as an industry characteristic due to certain industries receiving 
protection for several years while others have received no, or little protection. Gaston and Trefler 
(1994) detail three mediums through which trade and protection affects production, imperfectly 
competitive factor markets and imperfectly competitive product markets. In the first channel, tariffs 
lead to a reduction in imports, causing an increase in demand, and, therefore, an increase in wages. 
This structure would then raise wages in the protected industry relative to the economy-wide average 
wage. The second pathway, where tariffs affect wages via imperfectly competitive factor markets, is 
explained through an example of unions receiving the benefits of protection in the form of more jobs 
rather than higher wages. Lastly, the third channel relates to imperfectly competitive product markets, 
where tariffs affect the interaction between firms, and, therefore, affecting firm performance and 
wages. In this sense, protection offers domestic firms a competitive advantage as they are able to set 
a price below the world price plus tariff. Therefore, a higher tariff allows domestic firms to increase 
domestic price while imports remain unchanged. With a higher domestic price, firms are able to 
increase efficiency, leading to an increase in wages (Gaston and Trefler 1994). 
 These channels may also serve in illustrating the impact of sanctions due to the by industry 
characterization of sanctions as outlined by the U.S. and E.U. In the production channel, sanctions, 
instead of tariffs, would lead to a decrease in exports, generating a decrease in demand, which would 
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provoke a decrease in earnings. The second avenue of imperfectly competitive factor markets observes 
the burden of sanctions leading to a reduction in employment in a targeted industry rather than a 
decrease in earnings. Adjusting the third channel of imperfectly competitive product markets to 
sanctions, domestic firms would lose access to some global markets, forcing the firms to recoup these 
lost exports from other countries by charging a lower price than the world price. This decrease in price 
would create a competitive disadvantage and inefficiency for domestic firms, driving a decrease in 
earnings.  
 Instead of focusing solely on tariffs, Edwards (1988) evaluates the effects of a reduction in the 
world price of the country’s importables on labor allocation, unemployment, and wages. In his 
analysis, Edwards (1988) adopts a three-sector (exportables, importables, and nontradables), four 
factor (labor, and capital specific to each sector) trade model. These three goods are assumed to be 
gross substitutes in consumption and production with the income effect not exceeding the substitute 
effect in this model. To estimate the short-run effects of trade shocks, Edwards (1998) assumes that 
the capital is sector-specific while labor can move across sectors freely along with the full flexibility of 
wages.  
 In the construction of this model, the relative price movement of nontradables and 
importables in the domestic economy stem from the effect of capital account liberalization. As a result 
of freeing the capital account, there will be a large, rapid injection of foreign capital into the economy. 
In turn, this sudden increase of capital inflows produces a large current account deficit. Assuming a 
fraction of these inflows are spent on nontradable goods, the intake of these capital inflows will require 
an increase in the relative price of nontradable goods along with the real appreciation of domestic 




Figure 1: Short-Run Labor Market Equilibrium 
 
(Edwards 1984) 
These assumptions are used to create the initial market equilibrium illustrated in figure 1, 
where the horizontal axis represents the available labor in the economy and the vertical axis displays 
wage rate in terms of exportables. LT depicts the demand for labor in the tradable goods sector and 
is equal to the horizontal sum of the demand for labor in the exportables sector, LX, and importables 
sector. LN exhibits the demand for labor in the nontradables sector. The initial equilibrium in this 
economy is defined by wage rate w0 with the amount of labor in production designated by OTLA for 












The reduction in the price of importables generates changes in the domestic prices of both 
importables and nontradables, leading to the labor market adjustments in figure 2. The reduction in 
the world price of importables causes a lower domestic price of importables, decreasing the demand 
for labor in the tradable goods sector, shown by the downward shift of the LT curve. This decrease 
in the world price of importables also produces a decline in the price of nontradables, creating a 
downward shift of the LN curve to establish a new short-run equilibrium at S. As a result of the 
reduction in the world price of importables, wages decline in terms of exportables from w0 to w1. 
Wages have also declined for nontradables as the vertical distance between the LN and L'N curves is 
smaller than the decrease in wage from w0 to w1. Relative to importables, however, wages have 





Figure 3: Short-Run Labor Market Adjustment to Sanctions 
 
Using the theoretical model illustrated by Edwards (1988), this paper gauges the effect from 
the imposition of sanctions on earnings and job-switch behavior within the targeted country. The 
introduction of sanctions would lead to a decrease in both exports and imports in a targeted country 
due to constraints, enforced by another country, of engaging in international trade. Contrary to the 
liberalization of an economy as outlined by Edwards (1984), sanctions will also affect the capital 
account of a targeted country due to the sudden decrease of foreign capital inflows into the economy. 
The new restricted access to foreign capital results in a decrease of the price for nontradables relative 
to importable goods along with a depreciation of the domestic currency.  
The decrease in exports will induce a decrease in demand for labor in the exportables sector, 
shown through a downward shift in LX. As imports will also be restricted under sanctions, the 
reduction in imports can be perceived as an increase in the world price of importables. Therefore, 
domestic firms producing importable goods will observe an increase in price, leading to a higher 
demand for labor. While the demand for labor in the exportable sector sharply declines, the 
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importables sector observes an increase in demand, leading the LT curve to shift downward by an 
amount smaller than the decrease in LX. However, the degree to which the demand for labor in the 
tradable goods sector decreases is ambiguous, as the difference between the decrease in labor 
demanded by the exportable sector and increase in the importables sector is unknown. Lastly, due to 
the increased domestic price of importable goods, LN will shift upward to L'N.     
As a result of the imposition of sanctions, the exportables sector has experienced a decline in 
wages from w0 to w1. However, the nontradable goods sector observes an increase in wages as the 
vertical distance between LN and L'N is greater than the decrease in wages from w0 to w1. There is 
also an increase in the amount of labor demanded in the nontradables sector from ONLB to ONLF. 
The wages of the importable goods sector have also increased relative to nontradables as the domestic 
price of importables has increased by a greater amount than the decrease in wages. The change in the 
quantity of labor demanded for the exportables and importables sector remains ambiguous due to the 
unknown degree of the shift in the LT curve  relative to  LX. Therefore, the short-run labor market 
adjustments due to the imposition of sanctions result in a decrease in wages, causing decreased 
earnings within the exportables sector while both the importables and nontradables sector observe an 
increase in wages, and, therefore, earnings with the nontradables sector also recognizing an increase 
in the quantity of labor demanded.  
IV. Data  
 This paper makes use of micro-level data obtained from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey (RLMS). Conducted by Higher School of Economics and ZAO “Demoscope” together with 
the Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Institute of 
Sociology RAS, the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) serves as panel data collected 
through a series of nationally representative surveys from 1994 - 2018 within the Russian Federation.  
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RLMS is designed as a household-based survey intended to evaluate the effects of Russian reforms on 
the economic welfare of households and individuals. In the sampling of RLMS, there were several 
taxing hurdles to consider as Russia has a vast territory,6 the population is ethnically heterogenous, 
and the residential patterns are complex. Therefore, while RLMS portrays the first nationally 
representative random sample for Russia, it remains a highly clustered sample.7 
 Throughout the former Soviet Union, there was a considerable breakdown in the collection 
of statistical data. Furthermore, Russian Federation data collection systems did not provide a 
representative profile of the economic and social dimensions of the population, leading to inadequate 
monitoring of the poor. The goal of RLMS was to develop a sample of households8 that would meet 
scientific standards of true probability while also taking into account the operational constraints of 
Goskomstat (Russian Federal State Statistics Service). To meet these requirements, RLMS utilized a 
three-stratified cluster sample of residential addresses, excluding military, penal and other 
institutionalized populations. Due to the logistical problems with Goskomstat, 20 primary sampling 
units (PSUs) emerged as the maximum number of units that could be used. In selecting the PSUs, 
stratification was applied, taking advantage of substantial unpublished data from Goskomstat. These 
20 PSUs embraced as much variability as possible, much greater than the amount that would have 
been captured through a simple random sample of regions.9 
 In organizing RLMS, the first national sample frame of the Russian Federation was 
established, allowing surveys to be representative at the national level. The primary advantage that 
RLMS has over the data sources used in other literature assessing the impact of Western sanctions on 
Russia is the use of microeconomic data that follows the overall wellbeing of households and 
 
6 Russia spans across 11 time zones and covers more than 1/10 of the land mass of the world.  
7 Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, RLMS-HSE. 
8 This sample excludes institutionalized people (e.g. military and penal populations). 
9 Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, RLMS-HSE. 
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individuals rather than macroeconomic measures such as GDP. In the time period of 1994-2018, 
RLMS provides information on earnings and job switch behavior in several time periods before 
sanctions were introduced to Russia, allowing me to observe the labor market in the Russian 
Federation through other economic shocks such as the 2008 Financial Crisis in relation to the impact 
of Western sanctions.  
Figure 4: Trend of Earnings with 2016 Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
 
 As the RLMS panel data is collected through a series of questionnaires, information regarding 
the ownership type and industry of an individual’s work place is available in addition to their earnings.10 
Furthermore, individuals also report personal characteristics which can be used as explanatory 
variables in running our estimations. The RLMS questionnaires ask these questions regarding earnings 
and employment in reference to the previous thirty days, allowing for the most accurate and recent 
data collection in reference to microeconomic statistics in the labor market.  
 Since individuals were interviewed for RLMS at various dates throughout a given year and 
sanctions were imposed on Russia at irregular or sporadic intervals, the merging of the sanctions data 
 
10 See Appendix Table 11: Means of Log Real Average Earnings per Month in 2016 Prices By Industry Sanctioned. 
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with RLMS materialized as a general concern. Since the impact of sanctions on Russia would not 
appear immediately within the day they were imposed, the RLMS interview date could not simply be 
merged directly to the date of the sanctions, as the effect of the sanction would go undetected. 
Therefore, the interview date of each individual was merged to the most recent, preceding sanction 
that had not occurred in the previous thirty days.  
 This paper utilizes the RLMS data from 2010-2018 in order to detect any trends in the labor 
market that occurred before sanctions were imposed. Furthermore, the sample was constricted to only 
working-age adults (18-65). The earnings reported by individuals in this sample relate solely the 
earnings in the previous thirty days at their primary job. Therefore, earnings from secondary sources 
are excluded from the estimations within this model. The earnings that an individual reports are 
adjusted according to the 2016 CPI. Information regarding the industry and firm ownership also relate 
to the primary job of each individual.  
Table 2: Distribution of Individuals by Industry  
 
Industry Affected by Sanctions Frequency Percentage Cumulative  Percentage 
Defense 1607 2.02% 2.02% 
Energy (Oil and Gas) 2352 2.96% 4.97% 
Construction 6673 8.38% 13.36% 
Agriculture 3368 4.23% 17.59% 
Finance 1960 2.46% 20.05% 
Electric Utilities 1576 1.98% 22.03% 
Other 62053 77.97% 100.00% 
Total 79589 100.00%  
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An individual is able to report four different ownership types for their place of employment: 
government, private-domestic, co-owned, and foreign. Co-ownership refers to the partial ownership 
of both government and private entity. The ownership types of government, private-domestic and co-
owned were classified as domestic ownership types in this sample. The industry of each individual’s 
primary job is also utilized in the sample in order to identify the treatment group affected by each 
sanction. However, since the primary target of sanctions were the energy, finance, defense, 
construction, electric utilities and agricultural sectors, all other sectors were recoded as ‘other 
industries’ that were not affected by sanctions.11 
V. Empirical Strategy  
 
  In measuring the impact of sanctions, this paper looks at two different outcomes: labor 
earnings and job-switching behavior.  
  
5.1 The Fixed Effects Model in Estimating the Effects of Western Sanctions on Earnings 
 First, I describe the fixed effects model in estimating the effect of E.U. and U.S. sanctions on 
earnings. This model employs microeconomic, individual-level data from RLMS along with my 
sanction indices to estimate the consequence of sanctions on earnings. To remove the effect of the 
Russia’s counter-sanctions related to agriculture, the agricultural industry is not included in this 
estimation. The model can be illustrated through the following equation: 
$%&' = )*+%&' + )-.%' + )/0&' + )12' + 3% + 4%&'     (1) 
where $%&' is the logarithm of average monthly earnings for individual i working in industry j in year t. 
+%&' is one of the severity indices for the most recent sanction imposed on industry j at least 30 days 
before the date of interview (i subscripts are preserved because the date of the interview varies by 
 
11 Summary statistics of other key variables are located in the appendix.  
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individuals). The index is set to zero for other non-agriculture industries where the sanctions were not 
imposed. 0&' is the set of dummy variables for the five industries affected by sanctions (finance, energy, 
defense, construction, and electric utilities) and other industries. .%' is the vector of time-varying 
individual characteristics such as age, age squared, education level, marital status, number of children, 
and urban status. 2' captures year fixed effects, while 3% represents the individual fixed effects. The 
error term of the model stands as 4%&' under the assumption that it is identically and independently 
distributed.  
 Individual fixed effects are included in the model to capture time-constant unobserved 
individual heterogeneity. Examples of characteristics captured by 3% include time-constant 
components of abilities, risk aversion, job location, family background (e.g., parents’ schooling and 
occupation), demographics (e.g., gender and ethnicity), and other important factors influencing the 
level of individual earnings. Including individual fixed effects also allows us to control for time-
constant factors influencing the non-random selection into different industries (e.g., job preferences) 
and the selection into employment (e.g., commute time and other fixed costs associated with the 
decision to work). Thus, by using a fixed effects model, we are able to control for these omitted 
variable biases over time and reduce the bias in estimating the effect of a sanction’s severity on earnings 
()*). 
The equation (1) will be estimated for six different sanction severity measures of +%&' described 
in Section II.  
5.2 The Difference-in-Differences Model in Estimating the Retaliatory Effect of Sanctions  
 To estimate the effect of Russia’s retaliatory sanctions on earnings, I use a difference-in-
differences (DID) estimator. The DID model is more suitable than a severity index approach because 
the retaliatory sanction was a one-time event on the date of August 6, 2014. In this case, the treatment 
 27 
group is defined as workers employed in the agricultural sector prior to that date, while the control 
group is defined as workers in other industries: 
Let 6%	be a treatment group dummy defined as  
 
6%= 8
1, if individual i worked in agriculture in 2013
0, if individual i worked in other industries in 2013. 
The corresponding post-treatment variable, 9', is defined as  
9'= 8
1, if individual i was interviewed after August 6, 2014
0, if individual i was interviewed before August 6, 2014. 
Since RLMS surveys are done in the fall months, the post-treatment variable effectively takes 
the value of 1 for 2014-2018 survey years and the value of zero for 2010-2013 survey years.  
In the standard form, the effect of Russia’s retaliatory function on earnings can be estimated 
using the following DID model:  
$%' = ;<= + ;<*6% +	;<-9' + ;</6%9' + ;<1.%' + 4%̃'.     (2) 
 In the longitudinal data, we can include both individual and year fixed effects to account for 
time shocks and individual heterogeneity. In this case, 6% and 9' become redundant, and the model 
becomes 
$%' = ;*6%9' + ;-.%' + ;/2' + ?% + @%'.       (2’) 
The coefficient of interest is the difference-in-differences estimator ;*, which measures the 
percent difference in earnings between the treatment and control groups after Russia’s retaliation. The 
model is estimated in its simple version, without performing the balancing test, the overlap assumption 
test, inverse propensity weights, and other more advanced DID tools. 
5.3 Dynamic Logit Model for the Effect of Sanctions on Foreign-Domestic Job-Switching Behavior  
Since economic sanctions may impact foreign firms operating within Russia, I estimate the 
job-switching behavior between foreign and domestic firms using a dynamic logit model. I define A%&'
∗  
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as the latent propensity of individual i to work in a foreign firm in industry j and year t. The latent 




∗ = D= + D*A%&,'E* + D-+%&' + D/.%' + D10&' + DF2' + G% + H%&'.   (3) 
In this model, the observed variable A%&'	is an indicator taking the value of one if individual i is working 
for a foreign firm in industry  j at time t and zero if agent i is working for a domestic firm in industry 
j at time t, and  H%&' is the random error term with standard logistic distribution. The lagged dependent 
variable is included to measure the state dependence effect and to account for job switching between 
the two types of firms (foreign and domestic). The variables +%&', 0&', and 2' remain as previously 
defined. Including the lagged dependent variables in the models with fixed effects generally leads to a 
large bias (Nickell, 1981). Instead, the individual heterogeneity is captured through individual random 
effects, G% .  
Since the random effect approach permits time-constant variables, the .%' vector is extended 
to include gender and ethnicity variables. The model allows to estimate the marginal effect of sanction 
severity, +%&', on the probability of working in foreign firms.  
I recognize that the model is estimated in its simplest form and does not account for the initial 
condition problem and for the potential correlation between independent variables and the random 
effect. The RE model assumes no correlation of covariates with individual heterogeneity, which is the 
weakness of this model. 
A similar dynamic model can be estimated for the Russia’s retaliatory sanctions in the 
agricultural sector. In this case, the sanction severity index is substituted with the interaction term 
6%9'.		6% and 9' are redundant here as 6% is captured by industry fixed effects 0&', while 9' is fully nested 
within year fixed effects	2'.    
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5.4 Dynamic Multinomial Logit Model for Effect of Sanctions on Job-Switch Behavior with Non-Employment 
 As displayed in the theoretical model, I speculate that sanctions will not only lead to a decrease 
in earnings, but also a decrease in the demand for labor. The above logit model may be expanded into 
a dynamic multinomial logit model that includes the outcome of non-employment along with foreign 
or domestic ownership. Since there is no sanctions data relating to people who were non-employed 
before sanctions were imposed, the model is restricted to individuals currently employed. The A%&,'E* 
variable is unchanged as a dummy indicator for working in the foreign firm vs domestic firm. 
However, the dependent variable, A%&', becomes a categorical variable taking three values for working 
in domestic firms, foreign firms, and not working. All other variables in the model remain as previously 
defined. 
For measuring the effect of the Russia’s retaliatory sanctions on job switching and the 
probability of losing a job, the sanction severity index is replaced with the interaction term 6%9'.		   
VI. Results 
6.1 U.S. and E.U. Sanctions 
 Across virtually all estimations, the results represent a decrease in earnings and a decrease in 
employment under a foreign entity as a result of U.S. and E.U. sanctions imposed on Russia. The 
consistency of the results across all severity indices serves as validity while also aiming to eliminate the 
supposed biases in selecting only a single measure of severity. To account for the fluctuations of the 
stock market and short term discrepancies in the immediate impact of sanctions, the severity indices 
based on the change in stock market prices were calculated using two separate time periods. One time 
period measures the change in stock price 10 days following the imposition of a sanction while the 
other evaluates the change in stock market price 30 days following the imposition of sanction. 
However, as previously mentioned regarding data, it is important to note that this system actually 
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begins tracking stock price two days before a sanction is imposed to account for the flow of 
information through the market.  
Table 3: Effect of Sanctions on Earnings and Foreign-Domestic Job-Switch Behavior 
 
 MOEX Severity Index FactSet Severity Index RTSI Severity Index 
Parallel Weight (10-day)    













Parallel Weight (30-day)    





Marginal Effect on Foreign 
Ownership 






*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The parallel weights are designated by the time periods for which they track the 
change in stock prices following the imposition of new sanctions. The marginal effect below each parallel weight 
refers to the same time period as designated by the parallel weight directly above it. The marginal effect is measured 
according to the parallel weight measure of severity.   
 
The RTSI Severity Index yields the greatest change in earnings across all three measurements. 
In its most severe case, the RTSI severity index computes a decrease of 1.38% in average monthly 
earnings due to the impact of sanctions imposed on Russia. In extending the measure to the 30-day 
period following sanctions, all severity indices yield both negative and statistically significant results 
regarding a decrease in average monthly earnings. The marginal effect on employment with a foreign 
entity also yields consistent negative results across all three indices, suggesting a decrease in foreign 
ownership. However, these marginal effects remain small and statistically insignificant. With the steady 
analysis of a decrease in earnings following the imposition of a new sanction, the conclusion of U.S. 
and E.U. sanctions having a negative impact on the average monthly earnings in Russia can be 
comfortably deduced.  
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The Firms and Revenue Index, a categorical points system I created to measure the severity 
of sanctions, remained consistent with the previous estimations in predicting a negative impact on 
earnings and foreign ownership in response to sanctions.  
Table 4: Points System Effect of Sanctions on Wages 
 
 Firms and Revenue Index 
Severity Weight -0.00457*** (0.00165) 
Marginal Effect of Sanctions on 
Foreign-Domestic Job-Switch Behavior  
-.0000572  
(.0001392) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The marginal effect is measured using the 




While the data vary in their estimations regarding the extent to which sanctions negatively 
affected earnings in Russia, the consistent and steady outcomes of negative and statistically significant 
impacts across four different measures develops a strong conclusion that sanctions by the U.S. and 
E.U. negatively influenced Russian earnings.  
 
5.2 Russian Retaliatory Sanctions 
 To fully recognize the scope in the effect of sanctions, the impact of Russia’s retaliatory 
sanctions against foreign agricultural imports were also evaluated. Since the Russian retaliation against 
Western states was a singular event, a difference-in-differences estimator, rather than a severity index, 
was applied in estimating the change in earnings. Through this method, the difference between 




Table 5: Effect of Russian Retaliatory Sanctions on Earnings 
 
 Russian Retaliatory Sanction 
Difference-in-Differences Estimator 0.0561*** (0.0212) 
Marginal Effect of Sanction on 
Foreign-Domestic Job-Switch Behavior 
.0332506 
(.0007103) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The marginal effect on foreign 
ownership was estimated using the difference-in-differences estimator reported 
directly above it.   
   
 
Contradictory to the effect of U.S. and E.U. sanctions on Russia, the retaliation sanctions 
against foreign agricultural products by Russia resulted in an increase in earnings within the agricultural 
industry. In banning foreign agriculture, the Russian agricultural industry saw an increase in average 
monthly earnings by 5.61%. The blocking of foreign agriculture likely led to a decreased supply, and, 
therefore, higher prices, leading individuals employed within this industry to reap the benefits.  
 
Table 6: Effect of Retaliatory Sanctions on Foreign-Domestic Job-Switch Behavior with 
Non-Employment 
 
Firm Ownership Average Marginal Effect 
Foreign .0004581 (.0063574) 
Domestic .0204437 (.0147855) 
Non-Employment -.0209017 (.0137808  ) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The average marginal effect was calculated using the 
dynamic multinomial logistical  model described in the empirical 
model section of this paper. The difference-in-differences 
estimator from the previous table was used in calculating these 
average marginal effects.  
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The agricultural market’s reaction to these retaliatory sanctions were not only reflected in 
earnings but also ownership type and employment. The likelihood that an individual worked for a 
domestic firm saw a drastic increase within the agricultural sector while the foreign ownership 
remained virtually unchanged. Assuming the prices of agricultural products increased while a stronger 
demand for domestic agricultural emerged as a result of these retaliatory sanctions, it is likely that the 
amount of domestic firms within the agricultural sector rapidly expanded. Moreover, the likelihood of 
having no employment saw a strong decrease in the agricultural sectors as a result of these sanctions. 
With falling earnings in other industries negatively affected by sanctions, the Russian agricultural sector 
would emerge as a broadening industry, leading to a rapid inflow of new workers and domestic firms.  
VII. Conclusion 
 Using microeconomic data and newly developed severity sanctions, I find that the U.S. and 
E.U. sanctions on Russia caused a decrease in average monthly earnings within the industries of 
finance, energy, construction, and electric utilities. Sanctions also lead to a decrease in foreign 
ownership, however, these values were statistically insignificant and small in their estimated impact. 
Contrastingly, Russia’s retaliatory sanctions against the West lead to an increase in earnings and 
domestic ownership with a decrease in non-employment within the agricultural sector in Russia. In 
many ways, Russia’s retaliatory sanction against foreign agricultural products virtually served as a tariff, 
protecting the domestic agricultural industry. Nonetheless, it is necessary to adjust the manner in 
which economic sanctions are imposed in order to ensure that only the targeted state’s government is 
undermined rather than constraining the well-being of individual citizens. Since citizens are the main 
body that make up the economy of a state, imposing sanctions on the economy of a targeted country 
only serves to hurt the citizens themselves rather than influence the foreign government. Therefore, 
foreign policy may find more success in pursing more diplomatic measures in persuading a foreign 
government, as economic sanctions appear to affect citizens rather than the bureaucrats in power. 
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While this paper is able to clearly identify that sanctions do negatively impact earnings and job-switch 
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The Base Zero Weight is generated through the same means as the Parallel Weight. However, 
if a stock or index moves positively in response to a sanction, the severity is listed as zero. In the 
Parallel Weight, an increase of 3% would generate a severity of -3, however, in the Base Zero Weight, 
the severity would simply be zero. Lastly, the severity calculated in the Equation Weight can be 
determined through the following model:  
  If the stock price has decreased: 
EW=	[10+ -(%∆)]	× -(%∆) 
  If the stock price has increased:  
EW=	[10+ -(%∆)]	÷ (%∆). 
 
Table 1: Sample Calculation of Equation Weights 
 












Note: This table provides the output stemming from calculations using 
the Equation Weight severity index. The % change refers to the change 







Table 2: Sample Calculation of Parallel Weights  












Note: This table provides the output stemming from calculations using 
the Parallel Weight severity index. The % change refers to the change in 





























Table 3: Sample Calculation of Base Zero Weights 
 












Note: This table provides the output stemming from calculations using 
the Base Zero Weight severity index. The % change refers to the 



























Table 4: Effect of Sanctions on Earnings for All Severity Weights (10 Days After Sanctions) 
 
Severity Weight MOEX Index FactSet Index RTSI Index 























*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The Parallel Weight with Crimean Companies uses 
the industries of construction and electrical utilities along with finance, energy and defense 
as the effected industries in Russia. However, the firms sanctioned within these industries 
were located primarily in Crimea. The weights are calculated in this table using the change 





















Table 5: Effect of Sanctions on Earnings for All Severity Weights (30 Days After Sanctions) 
 
Severity Weight MOEX Index FactSet Index RTSI Index 























*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The Parallel Weight with Crimean Companies uses the 
industries of construction and electrical utilities along with finance, energy and defense as the 
effected industries in Russia. However, the firms sanctioned within these industries were 
located primarily in Crimea. The weights are calculated in this table using the change in stock 



































































































Note: Frequencies are in parenthesis. This table shows the distribution of people who 















Table 7: Frequency of Foreign Ownership for All Firms 
 
Year Non-Foreign Ownership 
Foreign 
Ownership Total 


















































Note: Frequencies are in parenthesis. This table shows the distribution of people 















Table 8: Average Marginal Effect of Sanctions on Foreign-Domestic Employment and Non-
Employment 
 
Average Marginal Effects RTSI Severity Index Firms and Revenue Index 
Foreign Employment .0017217 (.0026888) 
.0001185 
(.0001534) 
Domestic Employment .0065367 (.006152) 
.0000919 
(.0003686) 
Non-Employment -.0082584 (.0057372) 
-.0002104 
(.0003519) 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. This table represents the average marginal effect of 
Western sanctions on foreign-domestic employment and non-employment. These values 
were calculated using the dynamic multinomial logit model. The RTSI severity index was 
used as the sole stock market index in calculating average marginal effects as it yielded the 































Age in Years 0.0908*** (0.00402) 
Age Squared -0.000839*** (4.56e-05) 












=1 if married -0.00488 (0.0100) 
Numbers of kids =1 -0.134*** (0.0158) 
Numbers of kids =2 -0.212*** (0.0191) 
Number of kids =3+ -0.261*** (0.0321) 
Urban Status = other city 0.0604 (0.106) 
Urban Status = township 0.0467 (0.144) 
Urban Status = village 0.119 (0.146) 
If Year = 2011 0.0230*** (0.00499) 
If Year = 2012 0.0729*** (0.00554) 
If Year = 2013 0.121*** (0.00536) 
 46 
If Year = 2014 0.0847*** (0.00553) 
If Year = 2015 -0.00616 (0.00511) 
If Year = 2016 -0.0338*** (0.00545) 
If Year = 2017 -0.0188*** (0.00528) 
If Job Industry = Machine-building 0.00340 (0.0263) 
If Job Industry = Military Industry 0.00941 (0.0258) 
If Job Industry = Oil/gas 0.0994*** (0.0251) 
If Job Industry = Other heavy industry 0.0173 (0.0204) 
If Job Industry = Construction 0.0528** (0.0220) 




If Job Industry = Public administration -0.126*** (0.0264) 
If Job Industry = Education -0.195*** (0.0240) 
If Job Industry = Science/ culture -0.124*** (0.0232) 
If Job Industry = Health care -0.115*** (0.0217) 
If Job Industry = Army/ police 0.00374 (0.0212) 




If Job Industry = Finance -0.00830 (0.0296) 
If Job Industry = Energy 0.0472 (0.0303) 
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If Job Industry = Housing -0.0882*** (0.0218) 
If Job Industry = Other services -0.0656*** (0.0217) 
If Job Industry = Other industry 0.0388 (0.0294) 
Sanction Severity -0.00457*** (0.00165) 
Constant 7.824*** (0.106) 
Observations 59,571 
R-squared 0.060 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. This table presents the regression output from 
the estimations of sanction severity using the Firms and Revenue Index. The fixed 
effects model in estimating the effect of Western sanctions on earnings was used to 






































Difference-in-Differences Estimator 0.0561*** (0.0212) 
Age in Years 0.113*** (0.00650) 
Age Squared -0.000849*** (4.36e-05) 












=1 if married -0.00203 (0.00953) 
Numbers of kids =1 -0.127*** (0.0143) 
Numbers of kids =2 -0.200*** (0.0176) 
Number of kids =3+ -0.241*** (0.0292) 
Urban Status = other city 0.0508 (0.0949) 
Urban Status = township -0.0196 (0.132) 
Urban Status = village 0.110 (0.127) 
If Year = 2011 0.00590 (0.00729) 
 49 
If Year = 2012 0.0294** (0.0122) 
If Year = 2013 0.0532*** (0.0173) 
If Year = 2014 0.164*** (0.0196) 
If Year = 2015 0.0543*** (0.0142) 
If Year = 2016 0.00682 (0.00909) 
Constant 7.002*** (0.214) 
Observations 66,352 
R-squared 0.050 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. This table reflects the output from the 
difference-in-differences model in estimating the retaliatory effect of sanctions.   
 
  Table 11: Means of Log Real Average Earnings per Month in 2016 Prices By Industry Sanctioned  
 




























































































































































































































































Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Number of observations are listed between two dashes (-). This table list the means of log real average earnings per month in 2016 
by the industries sanctioned. The finance, defense and energy sectors were the main targets of U.S. and E.U. sanctions. Russia imposed a retaliatory sanction on foreign 
agricultural products, impacting the Russian agriculture industry. Construction and Electric Utilities are listed as the U.S. and E.U. sanctioned firms within these industries that 
were primarily located in Crimea. All other industries are listed under ‘other.’ 



















Table 12: Effect of U.S. and E.U. Sanctions on Earnings using FactSet Stock Market Indices  
 
VARIABLES Parallel Weight (10-day) 
Parallel Weight 
(30-day) 
Base Zero Weight 
(10-day) 




























Highest level of education 













Highest level of education 













Highest level of education 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































Observations 59,571 59,571 59,571 59,571 59,571 59,571 
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. This table represents the complete regression output for all severity weights in using the FactSet Severity Index for the fixed effects model 
to estimate the effect of Western sanctions on earnings. The weights are calculated in this table using the change in stock market prices both 10 days and 30 days after the 
imposition of new sanctions. The distinction of (10-day) or (30-day) under each weight distinguishes the time period after a sanction is imposed that the severity is measuring.  
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Table 13: Effect of U.S. and E.U. Sanctions on Earnings using MOEX Stock Market Indices 
 
VARIABLES Parallel Weight (10-day) 
Parallel Weight 
(30-day) 
Base Zero Weight 
(10-day) 
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Observations 59,571 59,571 59,571 59,571 59,571 59,571 
R-squared 0.06 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.06 0.06 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. This table represents the complete regression output for all severity weights in using the MOEX Severity Index for the fixed effects model 
to estimate the effect of Western sanctions on earnings. The weights are calculated in this table using the change in stock market prices both 10 days and 30 days after the 
imposition of new sanctions. The distinction of (10-day) or (30-day) under each weight distinguishes the time period after a sanction is imposed that the severity is measuring. 
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Table 14: Effect of U.S. and E.U. Sanctions on Earnings using RTSI Stock Market Indices 
 
VARIABLES Parallel Weight (10-day) 
Parallel Weight 
(30-day) 
Base Zero Weight 
(10-day) 




























Highest level of education 
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Highest level of education 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































Observations 59,571 59,571 59,571 59,571 59,571 59,571 
R-squared 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.06 0.061 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. This table represents the complete regression output for all severity weights in using the RTSI Severity Index for the fixed effects model to 
estimate the effect of Western sanctions on earnings. The weights are calculated in this table using the change in stock market prices both 10 days and 30 days after the imposition 
of new sanctions. The distinction of (10-day) or (30-day) under each weight distinguishes the time period after a sanction is imposed that the severity is measuring. 
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